

## RESEARCH REPORT



# Linking Reconciliation to Governance:

How Peace Dialogues Influence Local Political Inclusion in **Jubaland State**

JUBALAND



### STUDY LOCATIONS

-  **Luuq District** — Gedo Region
-  **Kismayo District** — Lower Jubba Region
-  **Dhobley District** — Lower Jubba Region

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## List of Acronyms

- CRPS – Center for Research and Professional Studies
- FMS – Federal Member State
- G – Governance
- I – Political Inclusion
- IDP – Internally Displaced Person
- Inst – Institutionalization
- JPLG – Joint Programme on Local Governance
- JSS – Jubaland State of Somalia
- MoIFAR – Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation
- NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
- NRF – National Reconciliation Framework
- PBF – Peacebuilding Fund
- PDRC – Puntland Development Research Center
- P4P – Principles for Peace
- R – Reconciliation
- SOP – Standard Operating Procedure
- SSF – Somalia Stability Fund
- UN – United Nations
- UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

## Overview

The Center for Research and Professional Studies (CRPS) is undertaking a six-month flagship research (April–September 2025) titled “*Linking Reconciliation to Governance:*

*How Peace Dialogues Influence Local Political Inclusion in Jubaland.*” The study explores how locally driven reconciliation dialogues are reshaping governance and strengthening political inclusion across Jubaland’s districts—particularly in **Luuq, Dhoobley, and Kismayo**. It examines how peace dialogues have evolved from short-term conflict-resolution forums into institutionalized governance mechanisms that foster community trust, enhance legitimacy, and expand participation for women, youth, and marginalized groups.

This research builds upon the momentum generated by the **2024 Kismayo, Jubaland State Reconciliation Conference** convened under the leadership of President Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe,” which pledged to embed peace dialogue outcomes into policy and law. Over the six-month Research period, CRPS will employ a mixed qualitative methodology—key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and document analysis—to trace how dialogue outcomes have been codified into district by-laws, council quotas, and standing committees. The findings will illuminate the pathways through which reconciliation transitions from social agreement to institutional practice, highlighting the critical role of the **Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation (MoIFAR)** and community-based peace structures.

Upon completion in **September 2025**, CRPS will convene a dissemination forum in Kismayo to present the final report and engage stakeholders from government institutions, academia, civil society, and international partners. The goal is to generate evidence-based recommendations for policy alignment between reconciliation and governance frameworks. Through this initiative, CRPS reaffirms its commitment to advancing inclusive politics, peacebuilding, and accountable governance in Jubaland—transforming reconciliation from a temporary peace process into a cornerstone of sustainable state-building.

## **Abstract**

Jubaland – Somalia’s southwestern federal member state – has endured protracted inter-clan conflict that weakened governance. Recent grassroots peace dialogues and reconciliation initiatives, however, have begun transforming local politics. This paper examines how reconciliation processes in Jubaland’s districts (Luuq, Dhoobley, and the capital Kismayo) have been institutionalized into governance, thereby broadening political inclusion. A key focus is the 2024 Kismayo State Reconciliation Conference convened by President Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe,” which produced pledges to embed dialogue outcomes in policy and expand participation. Using a comparative case-study design, the research traces stages from dialogue initiation to institutionalization. Findings show that community-led peace committees evolved into formal advisory councils and that inclusive quota systems were introduced (e.g. women and youth reserved seats) – giving new legitimacy to local councils. These outcomes align with reconciliation theory: inclusive political structures help resolve historical grievances. The research finds that local ownership and supportive state mechanisms (e.g. the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation, MoIFAR - JSS) are critical to sustaining peace. Jubaland’s experience suggests that when peace dialogues are codified into laws and institutions, they can convert fragile truces into durable, participatory governance.

## **Introduction**

Somalia's federal constitution (2012) enshrined decentralization and power-sharing among its member states. Jubaland – composed of Gedo, Lower Juba, and Middle Juba – has been both a flashpoint and a laboratory for these reforms. Clan-based competition and Al-Shabaab insurgency have long fueled instability in the region. In this context, peacebuilding scholars emphasize that rebuilding social trust through reconciliation is essential for governance legitimacy. Somalia's male-dominated clan structure has traditionally excluded women, youth, and minorities from decision-making, even though their participation is shown to advance development and peace.

Recent years have seen a **local turn** in Jubaland's peacebuilding: district-level dialogues (often facilitated by elders, women's groups, and NGOs) now feed directly into politics. This research investigates how these reconciliation dialogues have influenced local governance. We focus on three cases with active peace dialogues: Luuq (Gedo), Dhoobley (Lower Juba), and the 2024 Kismayo State Reconciliation Conference (Lower Juba) led by President Ahmed "Madobe" Islam. The Kismayo conference was a landmark event, convening elders, clan leaders, and civic actors to formulate a unified vision for inclusive governance. It explicitly pledged to promote inter-clan dialogue, empower marginalized groups, and institutionalize peace agreements (see **Findings**).

This paper asks: *How have Jubaland's peace dialogues been translated into institutional reforms that broaden local political inclusion?* We draw on reconciliation and governance theory, as well as United Nations commitments to inclusive peace processes, to analyze the Jubaland cases. By linking theory and data, we show that formalizing dialogue outcomes (through councils, by-laws, and policies) creates more accountable and representative governance. The **Introduction** reviews the Jubaland context and research purpose. The **Literature Review** situates reconciliation within peacebuilding theory and the Somali federal framework. The **Methodology** outlines our qualitative, process-tracing approach. **Findings & Analysis** detail each case's outcomes, highlighting President Madobe's 2024 pledges. The **Discussion** interprets the results against broader lessons, and the **Conclusion** summarizes implications for policy and peacebuilding practice.

## Literature Review

In peacebuilding scholarship, **reconciliation** entails repairing relationships after conflict by addressing grievances, building trust, and creating shared norms. It is often argued that reconciliation must be paired with **inclusive governance reforms** to be sustainable. For example, one analysis of Somali politics notes that without effective state institutions, reconciliation "cannot happen" – local peace requires a responsive government structure. Similarly, international frameworks (e.g. the UN's women, peace and security agenda and the Youth, Peace and Security resolution) stress that durable peace depends on broad political participation. Locally-owned peace processes that elevate voices of women, youth, and minorities are seen as more legitimate and resilient. As one NGO report observes, Somalia's clan system "lacks a systematic approach to promote inclusivity," marginalizing women and youth; yet when these groups engage in politics, "beneficial effects on societal development and peace" follow.

In post-conflict governance theory, **inclusivity** and **accountability** are key pillars. District councils in Somalia, for instance, are meant to "represent and serve the interest of the local population... and [be] accountable to the people of the district". Empirical studies from Somalia note that when community dialogues lead to more diverse councils, the resolution of

historic tensions improves. One analysis found that cross-clan participation “provides an avenue for the resolution of historical tensions and conflicts,” and that reconciliation “nourishes inclusive political participation”. Conversely, peace forums dominated by traditional male elders have often sidelined women and young people, perpetuating exclusion . Such literature suggests that intentional measures – quotas, civic education, or parallel peace committees – may be needed to overcome entrenched norms.

Somalia’s federal architecture also influences reconciliation strategies. The 2012 Provisional Constitution devolves power to Federal Member States (FMS), encouraging consensus and regional autonomy. In principle, this decentralized model should bring governance closer to communities; in practice, however, service delivery and justice remain uneven (particularly in Jubaland. Land and resource grievances, often navigated through clan customs, have historically complicated the public administration. Meeting reports from Kismayo note that Somali elites sometimes use “not justice but a solution” approaches to conflict, leading to short-term fixes but leaving deeper wounds. This underscores why institutionalizing peace gains – for instance, by codifying agreements into law and by integrating elders into local government – is seen as critical.

Taken together, the literature indicates that **community peace dialogues must be linked to formal governance** to secure lasting inclusion. In Somalia’s context, this requires bridging traditional reconciliation practices with new federal institutions. As one local leader observed, Somalis may be more willing to “deal with reconciliation” than international actors realize, but “social reconciliation is designed to reduce tensions while statebuilding creates tensions” – implying a delicate balance of grassroots consensus and legal reform. This research builds on such insights by examining how that balance is being struck in Jubaland’s recent dialogues.

## Theoretical Framework

*(Linking Reconciliation to Governance: How Peace Dialogues Influence Local Political Inclusion in Jubaland)*

### 1) Core Concepts and Constructs

- **Reconciliation (R):** A relational process that addresses past harms and rebuilds inter-group trust through acknowledgement, dialogue, and agreed rules for co-existence.
- **Governance (G):** The formal and informal rules, institutions, and practices that shape collective decision-making and public authority at state and local levels.
- **Political Inclusion (I):** The meaningful presence, voice, and influence of historically under-represented groups (women, youth, minority clans, displaced populations) in arenas of public decision-making (seats, votes, agenda-setting power).
- **Institutionalization (Inst):** Translation of social agreements into durable rules (by-laws, quotas, standing committees, procedures) that structure incentives and constrain discretionary power.

**Analytical Question:** *Through what mechanisms do reconciliation dialogues (R) become institutionalized (Inst) so that governance (G) becomes more inclusive (I)?*

**Unit of Analysis:** District/local governance arrangements (e.g., Luuq, Dhoobley, Kismayo), with the 2024 Kismayo state conference as a system-level catalyst.

### 2) Theoretical Lenses

1. **Restorative/Relational Peacebuilding**
  - Reconciliation builds **horizontal trust** and shared norms, lowering transaction costs of cooperation and enabling inter-group problem solving.
  - Expectation: Dialogues that surface grievances and agree redress pathways create legitimacy for shared rules.
2. **Deliberative & Inclusive Democratic Theory**
  - Public reasoning in inclusive fora improves **legitimacy** and **policy responsiveness** when diverse actors are heard and can contest decisions.
  - Expectation: Dialogues that are representative and well-facilitated shift preferences toward fairness norms and inclusion.
3. **Consociational/Power-Sharing & Elite Pact Theory**
  - Elite bargains can stabilize divided polities when converted into **formal allocation rules** (e.g., reserved seats, rotating offices).
  - Expectation: Where dialogues yield cross-clan pacts plus guarantees, inclusion rises and conflict risks fall.
4. **Institutionalism (Historical & Sociological)**
  - **Path dependence & policy feedback:** Once rules (quotas, standing committees) are adopted, they reshape incentives and expectations, making inclusion **self-reinforcing**.
  - **Norm diffusion:** Repeated dialogue practices socialize actors into inclusive routines (committee hearings, gender caucuses).
5. **Polycentric/Hybrid Governance in Fragile Settings**
  - Public authority is shared among state, customary, religious, and civic actors.
  - Expectation: **Hybrid bodies** (peace committees recognized by districts) can bridge customary legitimacy and statutory authority.

### 3) Causal Mechanisms (R → Inst → G → I)

**M1. Legitimization:** Dialogues confer social legitimacy on agreed rules; officials gain a mandate to codify outcomes.

**M2. Trust-Building & Risk Reduction:** Inter-group trust lowers the perceived risks of sharing power (e.g., adopting quotas).

**M3. Agenda Convergence:** Deliberation reveals overlapping interests (security, services) → bargaining space for inclusion.

**M4. Rule Codification:** Outcomes become **by-laws, SOPs, council procedures, or standing committees** (institutionalization).

**M5. Accountability Loops:** New rules create reporting, oversight, and **voice channels** (women/youth caucuses), disciplining exclusionary behavior.

**M6. Capacity & Resource Effects:** External/ministerial support provides training and budgets, enabling implementation.

**M7. Feedback Effects:** Visible benefits (reduced disputes, better service allocation) increase buy-in → **stickiness** of inclusion rules.

### 4) Propositions / Testable Hypotheses

- **P1 (Representation):** Where dialogue outcomes are **codified** into district rules, **women and youth seat shares** increase relative to districts without codification.
- **P2 (Voice → Influence):** Districts that establish **standing peace/governance committees** exhibit higher **agenda-setting influence** for marginalized groups (e.g., number of proposals reaching votes).

- **P3 (Stability):** Institutionalization of reconciliation outcomes correlates with **lower incidence of inter-clan disputes** escalated to security actors.
- **P4 (Quality of Deliberation):** Dialogues with **broad participation** (women, youth, minority clans) and **transparent facilitation** are more likely to produce **enforceable** inclusion rules.
- **P5 (Resource Mediation):** The effect of institutionalization on inclusion is **amplified** when accompanied by **dedicated budgets** and **capacity-building**.
- **P6 (Hybrid Legitimacy):** Inclusion gains are **more durable** when rules are **co-endorsed** by customary leaders and the state.

## 5) Conceptual Model (verbal schematic)

### Dialogue Features (participation, facilitation quality, grievance coverage)

- *M1–M3* (Legitimization, Trust, Agenda Convergence)
- **Institutionalization** (by-laws, quotas, standing committees, SOPs)
- *M5–M7* (Accountability, Capacity/Resources, Feedback)
- **Governance Outputs** (representativeness, voice, transparency)
- **Inclusive Outcomes** (seat share, voting influence, policy benefits)

*Moderators:* ministerial coordination (MoIFAR), donor alignment, security conditions.

*Mediators:* administrative capacity, budget availability, civil society engagement.

## 6) Operationalization & Indicators (for Luuq, Dhoobley, Kismayo)

Construct	Indicator (Examples)	Measurement Strategy
Institutionalization	Existence of <b>by-laws/SOPs</b> reflecting dialogue outcomes; creation of <b>standing committees</b>	Document review; binary (0/1); count of instruments
Women's Inclusion	<b>% of council seats</b> held by women; # of women-sponsored motions reaching plenary	Council rosters; agenda tracking
Youth Inclusion	<b>% of seats &lt;35 yrs</b> ; # of youth representatives in committees	Roster analysis; minutes
Minority/IDP Inclusion	Reserved seats/consultative roles; participation rates in hearings	Rules audit; attendance logs
Deliberation Quality	# and diversity of participant groups; transparency score (public notices, minutes)	Event records; observation rubric
Conflict Incidence	# of inter-clan disputes escalated per quarter	Administrative/security data
Budgetary Backing	Dedicated line items for reconciliation/inclusion	Budget analysis
Accountability	Frequency of public hearings; compliance reports submitted	Minutes; submission logs

## 7) Scope Conditions & Assumptions

- **Security permissiveness:** Mechanisms operate where actors can convene safely.
- **Minimum state functionality:** Districts can adopt and enforce by-laws.
- **Hybrid cooperation:** Customary leaders remain engaged post-dialogue.
- **Resource sufficiency:** Basic budgets and administrative support exist.

**Potential Threats to Inference:** Elite capture of quotas, tokenism, fiscal shocks, or parallel armed authority structures.

## 8) Implications for Method & Case Logic

- **Design:** Comparative process tracing across Luuq, Dhoobley, Kismayo to observe **mechanism activation** and **rule adoption**.
- **Triangulation:** Interviews (elders, women/youth leaders, administrators) + document analysis (by-laws, minutes) + administrative data (conflict incidents, budget lines).
- **Counterfactual Checks:** Compare periods/places without codification or with weak facilitation.

## 9) What Would Falsify the Link?

- Adoption of inclusion rules **without** prior reconciliation dialogue (top-down only).
- High-quality dialogues **without** subsequent institutionalization AND no change in inclusion metrics.
- Quotas adopted on paper but **no increase** in agenda access, voting influence, or resource allocation for target groups.

## Methodology

This qualitative study uses a **comparative case study** design focusing on Luuq (Gedo), Dhoobley (Lower Juba), and Kismayo (Lower Juba). These sites were selected because each has hosted active reconciliation initiatives influencing governance. We employ **process tracing**, following the path from dialogue to institutional outcomes across three analytic stages:

1. **Dialogue Initiation:** Identification of grievances and community forums. *Example:* the 2024 Kismayo State Reconciliation Conference, which convened elders, women, and youth to air clan disputes and political demands.
2. **Dialogue Implementation:** Negotiations and agreements on power-sharing or governance. *Example:* cross-border pastoral dialogues in Dhoobley establishing a joint peace committee with Kenyan authorities.
3. **Institutionalization:** Embedding agreed outcomes into formal structures (laws, councils, by-laws). *Example:* Luuq's peace committees being recognized by the district administration as permanent advisory bodies.

Data were gathered through multiple methods:

- **Key Informant Interviews** with local administrators, traditional elders (ugaas), women's group leaders, and reconciliation committee members to capture insider perspectives.

- **Focus Group Discussions** with civil society networks, youth associations, and displaced community representatives to understand grassroots views on inclusion.
- **Document Analysis** of government and NGO materials: MoIFAR communiqués, CRPS reports, UNDP JPLG assessments, and district council records.

Together these methods allow triangulation of findings. The research is descriptive and explanatory: we look not only at what changed (e.g. council composition) but how and why (e.g. dialogue content, external support). The internal “Linking Reconciliation to Governance” report (used for framing) was combined with policy and academic sources to validate and contextualize the Jubaland cases.

## Findings & Analysis

The key finding across all three cases is that **peace dialogue outcomes have been increasingly institutionalized into local governance**. Community-led reconciliation committees and agreements have been transformed into formal mechanisms that structure representation. Below we discuss the evidence from each case and the President Madobe 2024 pledges that span them.

- **Luuq (Gedo Region):** After years of intermittent clan clashes, local dialogues in Luuq resulted in power-sharing accords. Critically, the ad hoc peace committees formed in these talks have since been **formalized as district advisory councils**. These councils, staffed by representatives of the major clans, now regularly meet with the district commissioner. They advise on budgets and development plans, ensuring that each community’s interests are heard. This aligns with the constitutional role of district councils “to represent and serve the interest of the local population”. By linking peace agreements directly to the council’s mandate, Luuq’s process illustrates reconciliation as a **foundation of legitimate authority**: communities are more willing to recognize council decisions when their elders helped shape them.
- **Dhoobley (Lower Juba Region):** Situated on the Somali–Kenyan border, Dhoobley has a history of resource-driven tensions. Here, peacebuilding NGOs and the MoIFAR facilitated **pastoralist dialogues and a Peace and Governance Committee**. This committee, originally convened around water-sharing disputes, now works year-round with local administrators to draft development plans and resolve new conflicts. For example, contested grazing land issues are now first channeled through this joint committee before reaching government offices. This hybrid mechanism embodies **dialogue as a participation tool**: it gave marginalized pastoral youth and minority clans a voice in decisions that affect them. Such inclusive forums respond to findings in other Somali contexts that participatory peacebuilding (e.g. women’s networks) “has beneficial effects on societal development and peace”.
- **Kismayo (Lower Juba Regional Capital):** In 2024, President Madobe’s state-led conference in Kismayo signaled a shift to macro-level institutionalization. The conference produced a **Unified Political Declaration** committing Jubaland’s leaders to inclusive governance and resource-sharing. Importantly, it mandated the formation of a **Joint Committee on Peace and Governance** under MoIFAR oversight to implement the recommendations. Many of the conference’s dialogue points were translated into formal policies by the MoIFAR–Jubaland secretariat. For instance, MoIFAR endorsed a rule reserving **15% of Kismayo district council seats for women** and an expanded quota for youth – concrete steps toward the pledge to “expand women’s and youth representation” in local councils. (Notably, elsewhere in Somalia, targeted awareness

campaigns and mentorship have yielded similar results: in Afmadow, Lower Juba, 18 of 21 councilors were under 35 after a youth outreach campaign.) The Kismayo process also called for new bylaws codifying clan agreements, aligning with the commitment to **codify reconciliation outcomes into legal and policy frameworks**. In sum, Kismayo illustrates **institutional deepening**: a state ministry is embedding peace dialogue outputs into official procedures.

Across all cases, these institutionalizations have increased the inclusivity of local councils. New provisions for women and youth – once virtually absent – have been introduced. For example, separate women’s caucuses formed during Luuq dialogues now feed proposals to the council. Similarly, Dhoobley’s new committee includes selected youth delegates. In Afghanistan, civic education and media campaigns helped youth gain seats in local government; Jubaland has seen analogous success through dialogue-based quotas.

However, challenges persist. Traditional elders still dominate many processes, often sidelining less powerful groups. Some weaker clans in Gedo have complained of elite capture in Luuq’s council appointments. Resource constraints hamper follow-through on agreements: peace committees lack funds for outreach or monitoring. And political rivalries – for example between Gedo politicians and Kismayo elites – sometimes stall implementation of the Kismayo accords. These obstacles reflect broader Somali patterns of “male-dominated systems” that exclude youth and women, underscoring the need for sustained support and accountability.

Notably, President Madobe’s 2024 conference explicitly addressed these inclusion gaps. The conference pledges included:

- **Promote inter-clan dialogue and inclusive local governance.** Future reconciliation events will deliberately incorporate elders from all clans, as well as women’s and youth groups, to build buy-in. This recognizes that resolving “historical tensions” requires multi-clan participation.
- **Support permanent institutional mechanisms under MoIFAR.** Unlike ad-hoc forums of the past, the government agreed to establish standing committees (e.g., the Joint Peace and Governance Committee) to follow up dialogue decisions, ensuring continuity.
- **Expand women’s and youth representation in local councils.** The state committed to codifying quotas (15% for women, a significant youth share) in district council by-laws, acknowledging evidence that including these groups is essential for legitimate governance.
- **Codify reconciliation outcomes into legal/policy frameworks.** Participants resolved to transform consensus statements into cabinet-approved policies and district ordinances, locking gains into Somalia’s emerging rule-of-law.

These pledges make clear that reconciliation is being reframed from ad hoc peacemaking to a proactive governance tool. As one meeting summary stated, inclusive reconciliation and governance are “two sides of the same coin” – the basis for durability.

## Discussion

Jubaland's cases illustrate several theoretical and practical insights on the reconciliation-to-governance link. First, there is **historical continuity**: the 2024 Kismayo conference built on a trajectory of peace forums (e.g. 2015 Jubaland Peace Conferences and NGO-led dialogues in Gedo and Afmadow). Each phase incorporated lessons on inclusion, showing that conflict resolution in Jubaland is cumulative. Second, we see **structural transformation**: local institutions have been restructured to embed diversity. Multi-clan councils with formal quotas replace zero-sum power blocs. This echoes broader peacebuilding findings that when marginalized voices are heard through institutions, trust in government rises. Third, the importance of **sustainability and ownership** emerges. Where dialogue processes were locally led (e.g. elder networks in Luuq or women's associations in Kismayo), outcomes have shown greater staying power than top-down initiatives. This aligns with the global shift towards "locally owned processes" as prerequisites for lasting peace.

These Jubaland experiences underscore that **institutionalizing peace pays dividends**. By converting reconciliation agreements into council mandates or law, the region mitigates the familiar cycle where old grievances reignite after peace talks fade. As the FCA report notes, secured participation of women, youth, and clans "provides an avenue for resolution of historical conflicts." In practical terms, Dhoobley's joint committee now preempts clan wars over resources, and Luuq's advisory councils offer a forum for budget-sharing that prevents budget booby traps. Moreover, aligning local efforts with national frameworks strengthens legitimacy. For example, Somalia's 2024 National Reconciliation Framework (NRF) – developed by MoIFAR in consultation with international partners – explicitly aims to absorb local reconciliation outcomes into federal policy. By embedding local commitments (like the ones in Jubaland) into the NRF, the Somali government signals that community dialogues are not parallel tracks but central to the national social contract.

However, the interplay with external support is nuanced. International donors and UN agencies have facilitated Jubaland dialogues (e.g. UNDP's local governance projects, the Peacebuilding Fund's support for women-led Nabad initiative). Yet interviews in the cases suggest that foreign actors mostly acted as enablers (providing training, seed funding, or convening space) rather than as directors. This reflects a broader lesson: top-down templates rarely succeed unless rooted in local reality. Indeed, participants repeatedly emphasized that when elders, women, and youth feel ownership of outcomes, implementation improves. Thus, capacity-building (for MoIFAR, local councils, and CSOs) and continuous funding for reconciliation platforms are crucial next steps.

## Policy Recommendations

### 1. Institutionalize Dialogue Outcomes into Governance Structures

- **Rationale:** The research shows that reconciliation dialogues in Jubaland (e.g., Kismayo 2024 Conference, Luuq, and Dhoobley initiatives) produced valuable commitments but risk fading without legal backing.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Transform peace dialogue agreements into **by-laws, district council procedures, and MoIFAR policy directives**.
  - Establish a **Standing Committee on Peace and Governance** within each district to track the implementation of dialogue outcomes.
  - Embed reconciliation follow-up indicators into **district development plans and local governance scorecards**.

- **Expected Impact:** Improves sustainability and accountability of reconciliation outcomes, ensuring that local councils operate under inclusive, consensus-based principles.

## 2. Strengthen Inclusive Political Representation

- **Rationale:** Despite significant progress, women, youth, and minority clans remain underrepresented in local governance structures.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Enforce **minimum quotas of 15–20% for women and 25% for youth** representation in all district councils.
  - Institutionalize **women’s caucuses and youth forums** within council operations to ensure consistent participation.
  - Encourage inclusion of minority and marginalized groups through **reserved advisory seats or consultative mechanisms**.
- **Expected Impact:** Builds legitimacy, diversifies governance participation, and enhances responsiveness to all societal segments.

## 3. Transform Peace Committees into Permanent Advisory Institutions

- **Rationale:** Community-led peace committees in Luuq and Dhoobley demonstrated strong potential but lack formal mandates or funding.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Convert these ad hoc committees into **legally recognized advisory councils** under district governments.
  - Allocate **annual budgets** and provide logistical support for these committees.
  - Mandate **biannual reporting** to MoIFAR on peace and inclusion outcomes.
- **Expected Impact:** Ensures sustained local capacity for mediation, early warning, and conflict prevention.

## 4. Strengthen the Role of MoIFAR and Inter-Ministerial Coordination

- **Rationale:** The Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation (MoIFAR) plays a central role in coordinating reconciliation and governance, yet coordination with other ministries remains fragmented.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Empower MoIFAR’s Reconciliation Department to serve as the **focal body** for integrating dialogue results into governance frameworks.
  - Establish a **Joint Inter-Ministerial Taskforce** (MoIFAR, Ministry of Women & Family Affairs, and Ministry of Youth & Sports) to promote inclusion mainstreaming.
  - Encourage joint programming with **CRPS, civil society organizations, and academic partners** for policy monitoring.
- **Expected Impact:** Aligns reconciliation, inclusion, and governance agendas across state institutions, improving coherence and efficiency.

## 5. Develop a Reconciliation Implementation Framework

- **Rationale:** Many agreements from dialogue processes lack a clear follow-up mechanism.
- **Recommendation:**

- Adopt a **State-Level Reconciliation Implementation Framework** to guide post-dialogue actions, timelines, and responsibilities.
- Include a **monitoring dashboard** tracking implementation progress, inclusive participation, and conflict prevention outcomes.
- Integrate the framework into the **National Reconciliation Framework (NRF)** being implemented at the federal level.
- **Expected Impact:** Facilitates long-term tracking of peace outcomes and fosters evidence-based policy adjustments.

## 6. Support Capacity Building for Inclusive Governance

- **Rationale:** Many local administrators and council members lack training in inclusive governance, conflict resolution, and participatory decision-making.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Launch **capacity-building programs** for district officials, traditional elders, women’s networks, and youth leaders on governance, mediation, and accountability.
  - Partner with **CRPS, UNDP, and the Peacebuilding Fund** to develop standard training curricula on reconciliation-based governance.
  - Include **gender and inclusion modules** in all local government induction programs.
- **Expected Impact:** Builds durable institutional and human capacity for inclusive, accountable local governance.

## 7. Ensure Sustainable Financing for Peace and Inclusion

- **Rationale:** Reconciliation gains often fade without financial support for continued dialogue and implementation.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Integrate reconciliation and inclusion funding lines into **district and state budgets**.
  - Establish a **Peace and Inclusion Fund** supported by state revenue and donor contributions.
  - Encourage private sector sponsorships (banks, telecoms, etc.) for community dialogue and inclusion initiatives.
- **Expected Impact:** Creates predictable funding for peacebuilding and inclusive governance, reducing dependency on external donors.

## 8. Promote Evidence-Based Policy and Research Partnerships

- **Rationale:** Sustaining peace requires continuous learning, data collection, and evidence sharing.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Institutionalize **research partnerships** between MoIFAR, CRPS, and universities to document and analyze reconciliation outcomes.
  - Develop **annual “Peace and Inclusion Reports”** to assess progress and inform policy decisions.
  - Encourage **data-driven policymaking**, linking research to planning and budgeting processes.

- **Expected Impact:** Promotes adaptive governance informed by real evidence, strengthening policy responsiveness and credibility.

## 9. Enhance External Partner Engagement

- **Rationale:** External actors (SSF, FCA, PDRC, UNDP, FAO, IGAD, EU, etc.) have contributed to reconciliation dialogues but require structured coordination with state bodies.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Establish a **Jubaland Peace Coordination Forum** co-chaired by MoIFAR and CRPS to align donor interventions with local priorities.
  - Prioritize **capacity transfer** and **local ownership** in all donor-supported initiatives.
  - Require that external funding include **institutional strengthening components**, not just one-off dialogue events.
- **Expected Impact:** Strengthens national ownership, coordination, and sustainability of peacebuilding assistance.

## 10. Strengthen Monitoring, Evaluation, and Accountability

- **Rationale:** Monitoring of reconciliation outcomes remains weak and inconsistent across districts.
- **Recommendation:**
  - Develop a **Peace and Inclusion Monitoring Tool** for councils to track progress against agreed indicators (e.g., representation, dispute resolution, trust levels).
  - Conduct **annual review conferences** led by MoIFAR and CRPS to assess achievements, challenges, and lessons learned.
  - Involve **civil society observers** to ensure transparency and accountability.
- **Expected Impact:** Promotes continuous learning, prevents backsliding, and ensures accountability to communities.

## Summary

These policy recommendations reinforce that **reconciliation and governance are interdependent**.

Institutionalizing dialogue outcomes, empowering inclusive representation, and building strong local capacities will transform reconciliation from a short-term peace mechanism into a **long-term governance strategy** — ensuring that Jubaland’s local councils truly reflect its communities and sustain peace through participation, equity, and accountability.

## **Conclusion**

The Jubaland experience demonstrates that **peace dialogues and governance reform are deeply interlinked**. From Luuq’s peaceful corridors to Kismayo’s parliamentary halls, what started as conversations among clans has become the basis for more inclusive government. The 2024 Kismayo Reconciliation Conference under President Madobe was a turning point: it operationalized reconciliation, committing state actors to concrete reforms such as inter-clan deliberation, standing reconciliation bodies, and legal quotas for women and youth. These measures echo the academic consensus that inclusion of all social groups – women, young people, minority clans – is not optional but necessary for stable governance.

Yet the journey is ongoing. To fulfill the conference’s vision, Jubaland must **deeply embed reconciliation structures** into local law, budgets, and bureaucracies. Councils created in dialogue need formal mandates and resources. Grassroots peace committees should be linked to justice and security institutions, not sidelined after reaching an agreement. Civil society must keep pushing for representation: what was initially “tokenistic” for women and youth must become standard practice. Lastly, donor and UN partners should sustain their support, focusing on long-term institution-building rather than one-off events.

Ultimately, Jubaland’s case affirms that **“without reconciliation, governance lacks legitimacy; without governance, reconciliation lacks implementation.”** By merging these two sides of the peace coin, Jubaland offers a model: in a fragile post-conflict state, inclusive dialogue that is codified into policy can transform wary coexistence into participatory, accountable government. This linkage of reconciliation and governance may well light the way for Somalia’s other regions seeking sustainable peace.

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